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June 5, 2025
National Security On The Trump Agenda: Restricting Entry, Protecting Sovereignty, Enforcement of Student Visas, First Lady's Message To FTC, 'Drill Baby Drill' For National Defense
During my first Administration, I restricted the entry of foreign nationals into the United States, which successfully prevented national security threats from reaching our borders and which the Supreme Court upheld. In Executive Order 14161 of January 20, 2025 (Protecting the United States From Foreign Terrorists and Other National Security and Public Safety Threats), I stated that it is the policy of the United States to protect its citizens from aliens who intend to commit terrorist attacks, threaten our national security, espouse hateful ideology, or otherwise exploit the immigration laws for malevolent purposes.
I also stated that the United States must be vigilant during the visa-issuance process to ensure that those aliens approved for admission into the United States do not intend to harm Americans or our national interests. More importantly, the United States must identify such aliens before their admission or entry into the United States. The United States must ensure that admitted aliens and aliens otherwise already present in the United States do not bear hostile attitudes toward its citizens, culture, government, institutions, or founding principles, and do not advocate for, aid, or support designated foreign terrorists or other threats to our national security.
I directed the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence, to identify countries throughout the world for which vetting and screening information is so deficient as to warrant a full or partial suspension on the admission of nationals from those countries pursuant to section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1182(f). After completing that process, the Secretary of State determined that a number of countries remain deficient with regards to screening and vetting. Many of these countries have also taken advantage of the United States in their exploitation of our visa system and their historic failure to accept back their removable nationals.
As President, I must act to protect the national security and national interest of the United States and its people. I remain committed to engaging with those countries willing to cooperate to improve information-sharing and identity-management procedures, and to address both terrorism-related and public-safety risks. Nationals of some countries also pose significant risks of overstaying their visas in the United States, which increases burdens on immigration and law enforcement components of the United States, and often exacerbates other risks related to national security and public safety.
Some of the countries with inadequacies face significant challenges to reform efforts. Others have made important improvements to their protocols and procedures, and I commend them for these efforts. But until countries with identified inadequacies address them, members of my Cabinet have recommended certain conditional restrictions and limitations. I have considered and largely accepted those recommendations and impose the limitations set forth below on the entry into the United States by the classes of foreign nationals identified in sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States of America, by the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including sections 212(f) and 215(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(f) and 1185(a), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, hereby find that, absent the measures set forth in this proclamation, the immigrant and nonimmigrant entry into the United States of persons described in sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, and that their entry should be subject to certain restrictions, limitations, and exceptions. I therefore hereby proclaim the following:
Section 1. Policy and Purpose.
(a) It is the policy of the United States to protect its citizens from terrorist attacks and other national security or public-safety threats. Screening and vetting protocols and procedures associated with visa adjudications and other immigration processes play a critical role in implementing that policy. These protocols enhance our ability to detect foreign nationals who may commit, aid, or support acts of terrorism, or otherwise pose a safety threat, and they aid our efforts to prevent such individuals from entering the United States.
(b) Information-sharing and identity-management protocols and practices of foreign governments are important for the effectiveness of the screening and vetting protocols and procedures of the United States. Governments manage the identity and travel documents of their nationals and residents. They also control the circumstances under which they provide information about their nationals to other governments, including information about known or suspected terrorists and criminal-history information. It is, therefore, the policy of the United States to take all necessary and appropriate steps to encourage foreign governments to improve their information-sharing and identity-management protocols and practices and to regularly share their identity and threat information with the immigration screening and vetting systems of the United States.
(c) Section 2(b) of Executive Order 14161 directed the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence, within 60 days of the date of that order, to jointly submit to the President, through the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, a report identifying countries throughout the world for which vetting and screening information is so deficient as to warrant a full or partial suspension on the entry or admission of nationals from those countries pursuant to section 212(f) of the INA (8 U.S.C. 1182(f)).
(d) On April 9, 2025, the Secretary of State, with the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, presented the report described in subsection (c) of this section, recommending that entry restrictions and limitations be placed on foreign nationals of several countries. The report identified countries for which vetting and screening information is so deficient as to warrant a full suspension of admissions and countries that warrant a partial suspension of admission.
(e) In evaluating the recommendations from the Secretary of State and in determining what restrictions to impose for each country, I consulted with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, appropriate Assistants to the President, the Director of National Intelligence, and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. I considered foreign policy, national security, and counterterrorism goals. And I further considered various factors, including each countrys screening and vetting capabilities, information sharing policies, and country-specific risk factors including whether each country has a significant terrorist presence within its territory, its visa-overstay rate, and its cooperation with accepting back its removable nationals.
I also considered the different risks posed by aliens admitted on immigrant visas and those admitted on nonimmigrant visas. Persons admitted on immigrant visas become lawful permanent residents of the United States. Such persons may present national security or public-safety concerns that may be distinct from those admitted as nonimmigrants. The United States affords lawful permanent residents more enduring rights than it does to nonimmigrants. Lawful permanent residents are more difficult to remove than nonimmigrants, even after national security concerns arise, which increases the costs and aggravates the dangers of errors associated with admitting such individuals. And although immigrants are generally subject to more extensive vetting than nonimmigrants, such vetting is far less reliable when the country from which someone seeks to emigrate maintains inadequate identity-management or information-sharing policies or otherwise poses risks to the national security of the United States.
I reviewed these factors and assessed these goals, with a particular focus on crafting country-specific restrictions. This approach was designed to encourage cooperation with the subject countries in recognition of each countrys unique circumstances. The restrictions and limitations imposed by this proclamation are, in my judgment, necessary to prevent the entry or admission of foreign nationals about whom the United States Government lacks sufficient information to assess the risks they pose to the United States. The restrictions and limitations imposed by this proclamation are necessary to garner cooperation from foreign governments, enforce our immigration laws, and advance other important foreign policy, national security, and counterterrorism objectives.
(f) After reviewing the report described in subsection (d) of this section, and after accounting for the foreign policy, national security, and counterterrorism objectives of the United States, I have determined to fully restrict and limit the entry of nationals of the following 12 countries: Afghanistan, Burma, Chad, Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Haiti, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen. These restrictions distinguish between, but apply to both, the entry of immigrants and nonimmigrants.
(g) I have determined to partially restrict and limit the entry of nationals of the following 7 countries: Burundi, Cuba, Laos, Sierra Leone, Togo, Turkmenistan, and Venezuela. These restrictions distinguish between, but apply to both, the entry of immigrants and nonimmigrants.
(h) Sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation describe some of the identity-management or information-sharing inadequacies that led me to impose restrictions. These inadequacies are sufficient to justify my finding that unrestricted entry of nationals from the named countries would be detrimental to the interests of the United States. Publicly disclosing additional details on which I relied in making these determinations, however, would cause serious damage to the national security of the United States, and many such details are classified.
Sec. 2. Full Suspension of Entry for Nationals of Countries of Identified Concern.
The entry into the United States of nationals of the following countries is hereby suspended and limited, as follows, subject to the categorical exceptions and case-by-case waivers described in section 5 of this proclamation:
(a) Afghanistan
(i) The Taliban, a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) group, controls Afghanistan. Afghanistan lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents and it does not have appropriate screening and vetting measures. According to the Fiscal Year 2023 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Entry/Exit Overstay Report (Overstay Report), Afghanistan had a business/tourist (B-1/B-2) visa overstay rate of 9.70 percent and a student (F), vocational (M), and exchange visitor (J) visa overstay rate of 29.30 percent.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Afghanistan as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
(i) According to the Overstay Report, Burma had a B‑1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 27.07 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 42.17 percent. Additionally, Burma has historically not cooperated with the United States to accept back their removable nationals.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Burma as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
(c) Chad
(i) According to the Overstay Report, Chad had a B‑1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 49.54 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 55.64 percent. According to the Fiscal Year 2022 Overstay Report, Chad had a B-1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 37.12 percent. The high visa overstay rate for 2022 and 2023 is unacceptable and indicates a blatant disregard for United States immigration laws.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Chad as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
(d) Republic of the Congo
(i) According to the Overstay Report, the Republic of the Congo had a B-1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 29.63 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 35.14 percent.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of the Republic of the Congo as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
(e) Equatorial Guinea
(i) According to the Overstay Report, Equatorial Guinea had a B-1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 21.98 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 70.18 percent.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Equatorial Guinea as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
(f) Eritrea
(i) The United States questions the competence of the central authority for issuance of passports or civil documents in Eritrea. Criminal records are not available to the United States for Eritrean nationals. Eritrea has historically refused to accept back its removable nationals. According to the Overstay Report, Eritrea had a B-1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 20.09 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 55.43 percent.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Eritrea as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
(g) Haiti
(i) According to the Overstay Report, Haiti had a B‑1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 31.38 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 25.05 percent. Additionally, hundreds of thousands of illegal Haitian aliens flooded into the United States during the Biden Administration. This influx harms American communities by creating acute risks of increased overstay rates, establishment of criminal networks, and other national security threats. As is widely known, Haiti lacks a central authority with sufficient availability and dissemination of law enforcement information necessary to ensure its nationals do not undermine the national security of the United States.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Haiti as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
(i) Iran is a state sponsor of terrorism. Iran regularly fails to cooperate with the United States Government in identifying security risks, is the source of significant terrorism around the world, and has historically failed to accept back its removable nationals.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Iran as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby suspended.
(i) There is no competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents in Libya. The historical terrorist presence within Libyas territory amplifies the risks posed by the entry into the United States of its nationals.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Libya as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
(i) Somalia lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents and it does not have appropriate screening and vetting measures. Somalia stands apart from other countries in the degree to which its government lacks command and control of its territory, which greatly limits the effectiveness of its national capabilities in a variety of respects. A persistent terrorist threat also emanates from Somalias territory. The United States Government has identified Somalia as a terrorist safe haven. Terrorists use regions of Somalia as safe havens from which they plan, facilitate, and conduct their operations. Somalia also remains a destination for individuals attempting to join terrorist groups that threaten the national security of the United States. The Government of Somalia struggles to provide governance needed to limit terrorists freedom of movement. Additionally, Somalia has historically refused to accept back its removable nationals.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Somalia as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
(i) Sudan lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents and it does not have appropriate screening and vetting measures. According to the Overstay Report, Sudan had a B-1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 26.30 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 28.40 percent.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Sudan as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
(i) Yemen lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents and it does not have appropriate screening and vetting measures. The government does not have physical control over its own territory. Since January 20, 2025, Yemen has been the site of active United States military operations.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Yemen as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
Sec. 3. Partial Suspension of Entry for Nationals of Countries of Identified Concern.
(a) Burundi
(i) According to the Overstay Report, Burundi had a B-1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 15.35 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 17.52 percent.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Burundi as immigrants, and as nonimmigrants on B-1, B-2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J visas, is hereby suspended.
(iii) Consular officers shall reduce the validity for any other nonimmigrant visa issued to nationals of Burundi to the extent permitted by law.
(i) Cuba is a state sponsor of terrorism. The Government of Cuba does not cooperate or share sufficient law enforcement information with the United States. Cuba has historically refused to accept back its removable nationals. According to the Overstay Report, Cuba had a B-1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 7.69 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 18.75 percent.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Cuba as immigrants, and as nonimmigrants on B-1, B‑2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J visas, is hereby suspended.
(iii) Consular officers shall reduce the validity for any other nonimmigrant visa issued to nationals of Cuba to the extent permitted by law.
(c) Laos
(i) According to the Overstay Report, Laos had a B‑1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 34.77 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 6.49 percent. Laos has historically failed to accept back its removable nationals.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Laos as immigrants, and as nonimmigrants on B-1, B‑2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J visas, is hereby suspended.
(iii) Consular officers shall reduce the validity for any other nonimmigrant visa issued to nationals of Laos to the extent permitted by law.
(d) Sierra Leone
(i) According to the Overstay Report, Sierra Leone had a B-1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 15.43 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 35.83 percent. Sierra Leone has historically failed to accept back its removable nationals.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Sierra Leone as immigrants, and as nonimmigrants on B-1, B-2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J visas is hereby suspended.
(iii) Consular officers shall reduce the validity for any other nonimmigrant visa issued to nationals of Sierra Leone to the extent permitted by law.
(e) Togo
(i) According to the Overstay Report, Togo had a B‑1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 19.03 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 35.05 percent.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Togo as immigrants, and as nonimmigrants on B-1, B‑2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J visas is hereby suspended.
(iii) Consular officers shall reduce the validity for any other nonimmigrant visa issued to nationals of Togo to the extent permitted by law.
(f) Turkmenistan
(i) According to the Overstay Report, Turkmenistan had a B-1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 15.35 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 21.74 percent.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Turkmenistan as immigrants, and as nonimmigrants on B-1, B-2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J visas is hereby suspended.
(iii) Consular officers shall reduce the validity for any other nonimmigrant visa issued to nationals of Turkmenistan to the extent permitted by law.
(i) Venezuela lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents and it does not have appropriate screening and vetting measures. Venezuela has historically refused to accept back its removable nationals. According to the Overstay Report, Venezuela had a B‑1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 9.83 percent.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Venezuela as immigrants, and as nonimmigrants on B‑1, B-2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J visas is hereby suspended.
(iii) Consular officers shall reduce the validity for any other nonimmigrant visa issued to nationals of Venezuela to the extent permitted by law.
Sec. 4. Scope and Implementation of Suspensions and Limitations.
(a) Scope. Subject to the exceptions set forth in subsection (b) of this section and any exceptions made pursuant to subsections (c) and (d) of this section, the suspensions of and limitations on entry pursuant to sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation shall apply only to foreign nationals of the designated countries who:
(i) are outside the United States on the applicable effective date of this proclamation; and
(ii) do not have a valid visa on the applicable effective date of this proclamation.
(b) Exceptions. The suspension of and limitation on entry pursuant to sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation shall not apply to:
(i) any lawful permanent resident of the United States;
(ii) any dual national of a country designated under sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation when the individual is traveling on a passport issued by a country not so designated;
(iii) any foreign national traveling with a valid nonimmigrant visa in the following classifications: A-1, A-2, C-2, C-3, G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, NATO-1, NATO‑2, NATO-3, NATO-4, NATO-5, or NATO-6;
(iv) any athlete or member of an athletic team, including coaches, persons performing a necessary support role, and immediate relatives, traveling for the World Cup, Olympics, or other major sporting event as determined by the Secretary of State;
(v) immediate family immigrant visas (IR-1/CR-1, IR-2/CR-2, IR-5) with clear and convincing evidence of identity and family relationship (e.g., DNA);
(vi) adoptions (IR-3, IR-4, IH-3, IH-4);
(vii) Afghan Special Immigrant Visas;
(viii) Special Immigrant Visas for United States Government employees; and
(ix) immigrant visas for ethnic and religious minorities facing persecution in Iran.
(c) Exceptions to the suspension of and limitation on entry pursuant to sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation may be made for certain individuals for whom the Attorney General finds, in her discretion, that the travel by the individual would advance a critical United States national interest involving the Department of Justice, including when individuals must be present to participate in criminal proceedings as witnesses. These exceptions shall be made only by the Attorney General, or her designee, in coordination with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security.
(d) Exceptions to the suspension of and limitation on entry pursuant to sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation may be made case-by-case for individuals for whom the Secretary of State finds, in his discretion, that the travel by the individual would serve a United States national interest. These exceptions shall be made by only the Secretary of State or his designee, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security or her designee.
Sec. 5. Adjustments to and Removal of Suspensions and Limitations.
(a) The Secretary of State shall, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director for National Intelligence, devise a process to assess whether any suspensions and limitations imposed by sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation should be continued, terminated, modified, or supplemented. Within 90 days of the date of this proclamation, and every 180 days thereafter, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit a report to the President, through the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, describing his assessment and recommending whether any suspensions and limitations imposed by sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation should be continued, terminated, modified, or supplemented.
(b) The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall immediately engage each of the countries identified in sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation on measures that must be taken to comply with United States screening, vetting, immigration, and security requirements.
(c) Additionally, and in light of recent events, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall provide me an update to the review of the practices and procedures of Egypt to confirm the adequacy of its current screening and vetting capabilities.
Sec. 6. Enforcement.
(a) The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall consult with appropriate domestic and international partners, including countries and organizations, to ensure efficient, effective, and appropriate implementation of this proclamation.
(b) In implementing this proclamation, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall comply with all applicable laws and regulations.
(c) No immigrant or nonimmigrant visa issued before the applicable effective date of this proclamation shall be revoked pursuant to this proclamation.
(d) This proclamation shall not apply to an individual who has been granted asylum by the United States, to a refugee who has already been admitted to the United States, or to an individual granted withholding of removal or protection under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment (CAT). Nothing in this proclamation shall be construed to limit the ability of an individual to seek asylum, refugee status, withholding of removal, or protection under the CAT, consistent with the laws of the United States.
Sec. 7. Severability. It is the policy of the United States to enforce this proclamation to the maximum extent possible to advance the national security, foreign policy, and counterterrorism interests of the United States. Accordingly:
(a) if any provision of this proclamation, or the application of any provision of this proclamation to any person or circumstance, is held to be invalid, the remainder of this proclamation and the application of its other provisions to any other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby; and
(b) if any provision of this proclamation, or the application of any provision of this proclamation to any person or circumstance, is held to be invalid because of the lack of certain procedural requirements, the relevant executive branch officials shall implement those procedural requirements to conform with existing law and with any applicable court orders.
Sec. 8. Effective Date. This proclamation is effective at 12:01 am eastern daylight time on June 9, 2025.
On June 1, 2025, ANP articleCelebrating President Trump's Actions Enabling Our Competitive Edge, Protecting Our Sovereignty, And Strengthening Our National and Economic Securityaddressed the "Continuation of the National Emergency" Memoranda issued by President Trump. I have linked those memoranda to their respective countries above (Burma,Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Yemen, Cuba, and Venezuela). I must admit, when I saw "Somalia" on the list, my first thought went to the Somalian representative in OUR Congress. Unfortunately for us (but fortunately for her) Section 4.b. prohibits her expulsion from the states under this Proclamation.
COMBATING TERRORISM THROUGH COMMON SENSE SECURITY STANDARDS: Today, President Donald J. Trump signed a Proclamation to protect the nation from foreign terrorist and other national security and public safety threats from entry into the United States.
Pursuant to President Trumps Executive Order 14161, issued on January 20, 2025, titled Protecting the United States from Foreign Terrorists and Other National Security and Public Safety Threats, national security agencies engaged in a robust assessment of the risk that countries posed to the United States, including regarding terrorism and national security.
In Trump v. Hawaii, the Supreme Court upheld the Presidents authority to use section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act to protect the United States through entry restrictions.
The Proclamation fully restricts and limits the entry of nationals from 12 countries found to be deficient with regards to screening and vetting and determined to pose a very high risk to the United States: Afghanistan, Burma, Chad, Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Haiti, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen.
The Proclamation partially restricts and limits the entry of nationals from 7 countries who also pose a high level of risk to the United States: Burundi, Cuba, Laos, Sierra Leone, Togo, Turkmenistan, and Venezuela.
The Proclamation includes exceptions for lawful permanent residents, existing visa holders, certain visa categories, and individuals whose entry serves U.S. national interests.
SECURING OUR BORDERS AND INTERESTS: The restrictions and limitations imposed by the Proclamation are necessary to garner cooperation from foreign governments, enforce our immigration laws, and advance other important foreign policy, national security, and counterterrorism objectives.
It is the Presidents sacred duty to take action to ensure that those seeking to enter our country will not harm the American people.
After evaluating a report submitted by the Secretary of State, in coordination with other cabinet officials, President Trump has determined that the entry of nationals from certain countries must be restricted or limited to protect U.S. national security and public safety interests.
The restrictions are country-specific in order to encourage cooperation with the subject countries in recognition of each countrys unique circumstances.
Some of the named countries have inadequate screening and vetting processes, hindering Americas ability to identify potential security threats before entry.
Certain countries exhibit high visa overstay rates, demonstrating a disregard for U.S. immigration laws and increasing burdens on enforcement systems.
Other countries lack cooperation in sharing identity and threat information, undermining effective U.S. immigration vetting.
Some countries have a significant terrorist presence or state-sponsored terrorism, posing direct risks to U.S. national security.
Several countries have historically failed to accept back their removable nationals, complicating U.S. efforts to manage immigration and public safety.
MAKING AMERICA SAFE AGAIN: President Trump is keeping his promise to restore the travel ban and secure our borders.
President Trump: We will restore the travel ban, some people call it the Trump travel ban, and keep the radical Islamic terrorists out of our country that was upheld by the Supreme Court.
In his first term, President Trump successfully implemented a travel ban that restricted entry from several countries with inadequate vetting processes or significant security risks.
The Supreme Court upheld the travel ban, ruling that it is squarely within the scope of Presidential authority and noting that it is expressly premised on legitimate purposes.
This Proclamation builds on President Trumps first-term travel ban, incorporating an updated assessment of current global screening, vetting, and security risks.
JUSTIFICATION FOR FULL SUSPENSION BY COUNTRY
Afghanistan -The Taliban, a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) group, controls Afghanistan. Afghanistan lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents and it does not have appropriate screening and vetting measures. According to the Fiscal Year 2023 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Entry/Exit Overstay Report (Overstay Report), Afghanistan had a business/tourist (B1/B2) visa overstay rate of 9.70 percent and a student (F), vocational (M), and exchange visitor (J) visa overstay rate of 29.30 percent.
Burma -According to the Overstay Report, Burma had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 27.07 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 42.17 percent. Additionally, Burma has historically not cooperated with the United States to accept back their removable nationals.
Chad -According to the Overstay Report, Chad had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 49.54 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 55.64 percent. According to the Fiscal Year 2022 Overstay Report, Chad had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 37.12 percent. The high visa overstay rate for 2022 and 2023 is unacceptable and indicates a blatant disregard for U.S. immigration laws.
Republic of the Congo -According to the Overstay Report, the Republic of the Congo had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 29.63 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 35.14 percent.
Equatorial Guinea -According to the Overstay Report, Equatorial Guinea had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 21.98 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 70.18 percent.
Eritrea -The United States questions the competence of the central authority for issuance of passports or civil documents in Eritrea. Criminal records are not available to the United States for Eritrean nationals. Eritrea has historically refused to accept back its removable nationals. According to the Overstay Report, Eritrea had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 20.09 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 55.43 percent.
Haiti -According to the Overstay Report, Haiti had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 31.38 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 25.05 percent. Additionally, hundreds of thousands of illegal Haitian aliens flooded into the United States during the Biden Administration. This influx harms American communities by creating acute risks of increased overstay rates, establishment of criminal networks, and other national security threats. As is widely known, Haiti lacks a central authority with sufficient availability and dissemination of law enforcement information necessary to ensure its nationals do not undermine the national security of the United States.
Iran -Iran is a state sponsor of terrorism. Iran regularly fails to cooperate with the United States Government in identifying security risks, is the source of significant terrorism around the world, and has historically failed to accept back its removable nationals.
Libya -There is no competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents in Libya. The historical terrorist presence within Libyas territory amplifies the risks posed by the entry into the United States of its nationals.
Somalia -Somalia lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents and it does not have appropriate screening and vetting measures. Somalia stands apart from other countries in the degree to which its government lacks command and control of its territory, which greatly limits the effectiveness of its national capabilities in a variety of respects. A persistent terrorist threat also emanates from Somalias territory. The United States Government has identified Somalia as a terrorist safe haven. Terrorists use regions of Somalia as safe havens from which they plan, facilitate, and conduct their operations. Somalia also remains a destination for individuals attempting to join terrorist groups that threaten the national security of the United States. The Government of Somalia struggles to provide governance needed to limit terrorists freedom of movement. Additionally, Somalia has historically refused to accept back its removable nationals.
Sudan -Sudan lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents and it does not have appropriate screening and vetting measures. According to the Overstay Report, Sudan had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 26.30 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 28.40 percent.
Yemen -Yemen lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents and it does not have appropriate screening and vetting measures. The government does not have physical control over its own territory. Since January 20, 2025, Yemen has been the site of active U.S. military operations.
JUSTIFICATION FOR PARTIAL SUSPENSION BY COUNTRY (Immigrants and Nonimmigrants on B-1, B-2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J Visas)
Burundi -According to the Overstay Report, Burundi had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 15.35 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 17.52 percent.
Cuba - Cuba is a state sponsor of terrorism. The Government of Cuba does not cooperate or share sufficient law enforcement information with the United States. Cuba has historically refused to accept back its removable nationals. According to the Overstay Report, Cuba had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 7.69 percent and a F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 18.75 percent.
Laos -According to the Overstay Report, Laos had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 34.77 percent and a F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 6.49 percent. Laos has historically failed to accept back its removable nationals.
Sierra Leone -According to the Overstay Report, Sierra Leone had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 15.43 percent and a F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 35.83 percent. Sierra Leone has historically failed to accept back its removable nationals.
Togo -According to the Overstay Report, Togo had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 19.03 percent and a F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 35.05 percent.
Turkmenistan -According to the Overstay Report, Turkmenistan had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 15.35 percent and a F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 21.74 percent.
Venezuela -Venezuela lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents and it does not have appropriate screening and vetting measures. Venezuela has historically refused to accept back its removable nationals. According to the Overstay Report, Venezuela had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 9.83 percent.
Admission into the United States to attend, conduct research, or teach at our Nations institutions of higher education is a privilege granted by our Government, not a guarantee. That privilege is necessarily tied to the host institutions compliance and commitment to following Federal law. Harvard University has failed in this respect, among many others.
The Student Exchange Visa Program (SEVP) depends fundamentally on academic institutions good faith, transparency, and full adherence to the relevant regulatory frameworks. This is for crucial national-security reasons. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has long warned that foreign adversaries and competitors take advantage of easy access to American higher education to, among other things, steal technical information and products, exploit expensive research and development to advance their own ambitions, and spread false information for political or other reasons. Our adversaries, including the Peoples Republic of China, try to take advantage of American higher education by exploiting the student visa program for improper purposes and by using visiting students to collect information at elite universities in the United States.
Protecting our national security requires host institutions of foreign students to provide sufficient information, when asked, to enable the Federal Government to identify and address misconduct by those foreign students. In my judgment, it presents an unacceptable risk to our Nations security for an academic institution to refuse to provide sufficient information, when asked, about known instances of misconduct and criminality committed by its foreign students. This principle is one reason why SEVP regulations require foreign students to obey Federal and State criminal laws and require universities to keep records about foreign students studies in the United States including records relating to criminal activity by foreign students and resulting disciplinary proceedings and furnish them to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) on request.
Crime rates at Harvard University including violent crime rates have drastically risen in recent years. Harvard has failed to discipline at least some categories of conduct violations on campus. Given these facts, it is imperative, in my judgment, that the Federal Government be able to assess and, if necessary, address misconduct and crimes committed by foreign students at Harvard.
Despite the risks described above, Harvard University has refused the recent requests of the DHS for information about foreign students known illegal activity, known dangerous and violent activity, known threats to other students or university personnel, known deprivation of rights of other classmates or university personnel, and whether those activities occurred on campus, and other related data. Harvard provided data on misconduct by only three students, and the data it provided was so deficient that the DHS could not evaluate whether it should take further actions. Harvards actions show that it either is not fully reporting its disciplinary records for foreign students or is not seriously policing its foreign students. In my judgment, these actions and failures directly undermine the Federal Governments ability to ensure that foreign nationals admitted on student or exchange visitor visas remain in compliance with Federal law.
These concerns have compelled the Federal Government to conclude that Harvard University is no longer a trustworthy steward of international student and exchange visitor programs. When a university refuses to uphold its legal obligations, including its recordkeeping and reporting obligations, the consequences ripple far beyond the campus. They jeopardize the integrity of the entire United States student and exchange visitor visa system, compromise national security, and embolden other institutions to similarly disregard the rule of law.
Harvard University has also developed extensive entanglements with foreign countries, including our adversaries. According to The Harvard Crimson, Harvard has received more than $150 million in total contributions from foreign governments over the last 5 years, and over $1 billion from foreign sources. Over the last 10 years, Harvard has received more than $150 million from China alone. In exchange, Harvard has, among other things, repeatedly hosted and trained members of a Chinese Communist Party paramilitary organization, according to a probe by the House of Representatives Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party. Harvard researchers have also partnered with China-based individuals on research that could advance Chinas military modernization, according to the same probe.
Finally, Harvard University continues to flout the civil rights of its students and faculty, triggering multiple Federal investigations. Harvards discrimination against disfavored races in admissions was so blatant that the Supreme Court decision ending the practice nationwide bears Harvards name. Yet even after that Supreme Court decision, Harvard and its affiliated organizations on campus continue to deny hardworking Americans equal opportunities. Instead of those Americans, Harvard admits students from non-egalitarian nations, including nations that seek the destruction of the United States and its allies, or the extermination of entire peoples. It is not in the interest of the United States to further compound Harvards discrimination against non-preferred races, national origins, shared ancestries, or religions by further reducing opportunities for American students through excessive foreign student enrollment.
Considering these facts, I have determined that it is necessary to restrict the entry of foreign nationals who seek to enter the United States solely or principally to participate in a course of study at Harvard University or in an exchange visitor program hosted by Harvard University. Such restrictions are authorized under sections 212(f) and 215(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1182(f) and 1185(a), which authorize the President to suspend entry of any class of aliens whose entry would be detrimental to the interests of the United States. I have determined that the entry of the class of foreign nationals described above is detrimental to the interests of the United States because, in my judgment, Harvards conduct has rendered it an unsuitable destination for foreign students and researchers. Until such time as the university shares the information that the Federal Government requires to safeguard national security and the American public, it is in the national interest to deny foreign nationals access to Harvard under the auspices of educational exchange.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States of America, by the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including sections 212(f) and 215(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(f) and 1185(a), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, hereby find that, absent the measures set forth in this proclamation, the entry into the United States of persons described in section 1 of this proclamation would, except as provided for in section 2 of this proclamation, be detrimental to the interests of the United States, and that their entry should be subject to certain restrictions, limitations, and exceptions. I hereby proclaim as follows:
Section 1. Suspension of Entry.
The entry of any alien into the United States as a nonimmigrant to pursue a course of study at Harvard University under section 101(a)(15)(F) or section 101(a)(15)(M) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(F) or 1101(a)(15)(M), or to participate in an exchange visitor program hosted by Harvard University under section 101(a)(15)(J) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(J), is suspended and limited, subject to section 2 of this proclamation. That suspension and limitation shall expire, absent extension, 6 months after the date of this proclamation.
Sec. 2. Scope and Implementation of Suspension and Limitation on Entry.
(a) The suspension and limitation on entry pursuant to section 1 of this proclamation shall apply to aliens who enter or attempt to enter the United States to begin attending Harvard University through the SEVP after the date of this proclamation.
(b) The Secretary of State shall consider, in the Secretarys discretion, whether foreign nationals who currently attend Harvard University and are in the United States pursuant to F, M, or J visas and who otherwise meet the criteria described in section 1 of this proclamation should have their visas revoked pursuant to section 221(i) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1201(i).
(c) The suspension and limitation on entry pursuant to section 1 of this proclamation shall not apply to any alien who enters the United States to attend other universities through the SEVP.
(d) The suspension and limitation on entry pursuant to section 1 of this proclamation shall not apply to any alien whose entry would be in the national interest, as determined by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security, or their respective designees.
(e) No later than 90 days after the date of this proclamation, the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall jointly submit to the President, through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, a recommendation on whether an extension or renewal of the suspension and limitation on entry in section 1 of this proclamation is in the interests of the United States.
Sec. 3. Operational Action to Implement this Order. The Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall coordinate to take all necessary and appropriate action to implement this proclamation. The Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall also consider using their respective authorities under the INA to impose limitations on Harvard Universitys ability to participate in the SEVP and the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System. Any such actions should include an exception for any alien whose entry would be in the national interest, as determined by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security, or their respective designees.
RESTRICTING FOREIGN STUDENT VISAS AT HARVARD: Today, President Donald J. Trump signed a Proclamation to safeguard national security by suspending the entry of foreign nationals seeking to study or participate in exchange programs at Harvard University.
The Proclamation suspends the entry into the United States of any new Harvard student as a nonimmigrant under F, M, or J visas.
It directs the Secretary of State to consider revoking existing F, M, or J visas for current Harvard students who meet the Proclamations criteria.
The Proclamation does not apply to aliens attending other U.S. universities through the Student Exchange Visa Program (SEVP) and exempts aliens whose entry is deemed in the national interest.
HARVARD HAS A DEMONSTRATED HISTORY OF CONCERNING FOREIGN TIES AND RADICALISM:
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has long warned that foreign adversaries take advantage of easy access to American higher education to steal information, exploit research and development, and spread false information.
The University has seen a drastic rise in crime in recent years, while failing to discipline at least some categories of conduct violations on campus.
Harvard has failed to provide sufficient information to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) about foreign students known illegal or dangerous activities, reporting deficient data on only three students.
Harvard is either not fully reporting its disciplinary records for foreign students or is not seriously policing its foreign students.
Harvard has also developed extensive entanglements with foreign adversaries, receiving more than $150 million from China alone. In exchange, Harvard has, among other things, hosted Chinese Communist Party paramilitary members and partnered with China-based individuals on research that could advance Chinas military modernization.
The Chinese Communist Party has sent thousands of mid-career and senior bureaucrats to study at U.S. institutions, with Harvard University considered the top party school outside the country. Xi Jinpings own daughter attended Harvard as an undergraduate in the early 2010s.
Harvard has failed to adequately address violent anti-Semitic incidents on campus, with many of these agitators found to be foreign students.
Harvard has persisted in prioritizing diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) in its admissions, denying hardworking Americans equal opportunities by favoring certain groups, despite the U.S. Supreme Courts 2023 ruling against its race-based practices.
These concerns have compelled the Federal government to conclude that Harvard University is no longer a trustworthy steward of international student and exchange visitor programs.
HOLDING HARVARD ACCOUNTABLE: President Trump wants our institutions to have foreign students, but believes that the foreign students should be people that can love our country.
President Trump: The students? Well, we want to have great students here. We just dont want students that are causing trouble. We want to have students. I want to have foreign students.
President Trump: We have people who want to go to Harvard and other schools, they cant get in because we have foreign students there. But I want to make sure that the foreign students are people that can love our country.
President Trump: We are still waiting for the Foreign Student Lists from Harvard so that we can determine, after a ridiculous expenditure of BILLIONS OF DOLLARS, how many radicalized lunatics, troublemakers all, should not be let back into our Country. Harvard is very slow in the presentation of these documents, and probably for good reason!
Many of us feel "it's about time" this topic has been addressed! On June 4, 2024, President Trump issued the Memorandum Reviewing Certain Presidential Actionsto investigate the autopen use by the Biden/Harris Administration and their staff:
Section 1. Background. The President of the United States, as the unitary head of the executive branch, holds tremendous power and responsibility through his signature: words on paper can become the law of the land, individuals are appointed to some of the highest offices in Government, national policies can be created or eliminated, and prisoners can go free. In sum, the Nation is governed through Presidential signatures.
In recent months, it has become increasingly apparent that former President Bidens aides abused the power of Presidential signatures through the use of an autopen to conceal Bidens cognitive decline and assert Article II authority. This conspiracy marks one of the most dangerous and concerning scandals in American history. The American public was purposefully shielded from discovering who wielded the executive power, all while Bidens signature was deployed across thousands of documents to effect radical policy shifts.
For years, President Biden suffered from serious cognitive decline. The Department of Justice, for example, concluded that, despite clear evidence that Biden had broken the law, he should not stand trial owing to his incompetent mental state. Bidens cognitive issues and apparent mental decline during his Presidency were even worse in private, and those closest to him tried to hide it from the public. To do so, Bidens advisors during his years in office severely restricted his news conferences and media appearances, and they scripted his conversations with lawmakers, government officials, and donors, all to cover up his inability to discharge his duties.
Notwithstanding these well-documented issues, the White House issued over 1,200 Presidential documents, appointed 235 judges to the Federal bench, and issued more pardons and commutations than any administration in United States history. For instance, just 2 days before Christmas in 2024, the White House announced that Biden commuted the sentences of 37 of the 40 most vile and monstrous criminals on Federal death row, including several child killers and mass murderers.
Although the authority to take these executive actions, along with many others, is constitutionally committed to the President, there are serious doubts as to the decision making process and even the degree of Bidens awareness of these actions being taken in his name.
The vast majority of Bidens executive actions were signed using a mechanical signature pen, often called an autopen, as opposed to Bidens own hand. This was especially true of actions taken during the second half of his Presidency, when his cognitive decline had apparently become even more clear to those working most closely with him.
Given clear indications that President Biden lacked the capacity to exercise his Presidential authority, if his advisors secretly used the mechanical signature pen to conceal this incapacity, while taking radical executive actions all in his name, that would constitute an unconstitutional wielding of the power of the Presidency, a circumstance that would have implications for the legality and validity of numerous executive actions undertaken in Bidens name.
Sec. 2. Investigation.
(a) The Counsel to the President, in consultation with the Attorney General and the head of any other relevant executive department or agency (agency), shall investigate, to the extent permitted by law, whether certain individuals conspired to deceive the public about Bidens mental state and unconstitutionally exercise the authorities and responsibilities of the President. This investigation shall address:
(i) any activity, coordinated or otherwise, to purposefully shield the public from information regarding Bidens mental and physical health;
(ii) any agreements between Bidens aides to cooperatively and falsely deem recorded videos of the Presidents cognitive inability as fake;
(iii) any agreements between Bidens aides to require false, public statements elevating the Presidents capabilities; and
(iv) the purpose of these activities, including to assert the authorities of the President.
(b) The Counsel to the President shall also investigate, in consultation with the Attorney General and the head of any other relevant agency, the circumstances surrounding Bidens supposed execution of numerous executive actions during his final years in office. This investigation shall address:
(i) the policy documents for which the autopen was used, including clemency grants, Executive Orders, Presidential memoranda, or other Presidential policy decisions; and
(ii) who directed that the Presidents signature be affixed.
INVESTIGATING EXECUTIVE ACTIONS UNDER BIDENS PRESIDENCY: Today, President Donald J. Trump signed a Presidential Memorandum directing an investigation into who ran the United States while President Biden was in office.
The Memorandum directs an investigation into whether certain individuals conspired to deceive the public about Bidens mental state and unconstitutionally exercise the authorities and responsibilities of the President.
The Memorandum also mandates an investigation into the circumstances surrounding Bidens purported execution of the numerous executive actions during his final years in office, examining policy documents signed with an autopen, who authorized its use, and the validity of the resulting Presidential policy decisions.
QUESTIONING WHO WIELDED THE EXECUTIVE POWER DURING THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION: The combined nature of Bidens documented cognitive decline and the repeated use of an autopen raises serious concerns about the legitimacy of his actions.
Reports indicate that, for years, Biden suffered from serious cognitive decline.
For example, although the Department of Justice found that Biden had violated the law by willfully retaining and disclosing classified materials, it ultimately concluded that Biden was unfit to stand trial given his incompetent mental state.
Bidens cognitive issues and apparent mental decline were reportedly even worse in private, with those closest to him attempting to conceal it from the public.
Bidens advisors severely restricted his news conferences and media appearances, scripting his conversations with lawmakers, government officials, and donors.
Despite Bidens cognitive deficiencies, the White House issued over 1,200 Presidential documents, appointed 235 judges to the Federal bench, and issued more pardons and commutations than any Administration in U.S. history.
Just two days before Christmas in 2024, Biden commuted the sentences of 37 of the 40 most vile and monstrous criminals on Federal death row, including several child killers and mass murderers.
The authority to take these executive actions is constitutionally reserved for the President, yet the Biden White House used an autopen to execute the vast majority of Bidens executive actions, particularly during the second half of his Presidency.
RESTORING PRESIDENTIAL ACCOUNTABILITY: President Trump believes Americans deserve answers as to whether President Biden signed these documents, and if not, who signed them, and under what circumstances.
President Trump: And you know what, they ought to find out who was using that autopen. Because whoever that person was, he or she was like the President of the United States I think a President should sign it, not use an autopen. And were going to find out whether or not he knew what the hell he was doing. So I think its something that we should really look at because thats so important.
President Trump: The real question who ran the autopen, OK? Who ran the autopen? Because the things that were signed were signed illegally, in my opinion.
Since returning to office, President Trump has held numerous open-press signing events where the American public can witness President Trumps signature and knowledge regarding the matters in question with their own eyes.
Even the legacy media admits that President Trump is on track to becoming the most-accessible President in modern history.
Today marks the 83rd anniversary of Americas seminal victory at the Battle of Midwaya watershed moment in World War II that set the Allied Forces on the path to ultimate triumph over forces of evil.
After the shocking attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, Imperial Japan surged across the Pacificdealing Allied forces a series of defeats from the fall of the Philippines, to the capture of Hong Kong and Singapore, to devastating air raids over Australia. With the U.S. Navy still reeling from the surprise attack, Japans ruthless push for regional dominance seemed unstoppable.
By the summer of 1942, Japan set its sights on Midway Islanda tiny American outpost with massive strategic value, just over 1,000 miles from Hawaii. The Japanese plan was clear: lure what remained of the battered U.S. Pacific Fleet out of Pearl Harbor, destroy it, and capture Midway, from where they would launch further offensives across the Pacific.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt knew our Armed Forces had to act decisively. He tasked Admiral Chester Nimitz, a submariner and newly appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, with launching a full-scale effort to restore the Navys remaining ships to fighting condition. With vital intelligence from American codebreakers, the Allies stayed one step ahead, anticipating the major elements of Japans strategy.
At dawn on June 4, 1942, the U.S. Navy struck back. Despite facing a larger enemy force and suffering heavy losses, the U.S. fleet under the command of Admirals Jack Fletcher and Raymond Spruance fought with unmatched resolve. In the course of twenty-four hours, they sank four Japanese aircraft carriers, destroyed a heavy cruiser, and crushed Japanese hopes of advancing deeper into the eastern Pacificpaving the way for our Nations acceptance of Japans unconditional surrender and the end of World War II in 1945.
Today, former enemies stand united as allies. The United States and Japan have forged an enduring partnership built on the shared values of freedom, sovereignty, and an abiding commitment to peace across the Indo-Pacific. Together, we are advancing the causes of safety, security, prosperity, and libertyall while confronting threats from China and North Korea.
The epic Battle of Midway stands to this day as a glorious reminder that, even in the face of long odds, perilous danger, and tremendous uncertainty, no challenge is too great for the strength of the American spirit. As our Nation commemorates this legendary battle, we honor the grit of our servicemen, we pay tribute to the sacrifice of our veterans, and we vow to carry forward the legacy of the fallen heroes who secured victory over tyranny in the Pacific 80 years ago.
Today, First Lady Melania Trump reaffirmed her commitment to the protection and well-being of children and youth in the digital space by sending a written message to participants of a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) workshop entitled, The Attention Economy: How Big Tech Firms Exploit Children and Hurt Families.
In her message, Mrs. Trump said, I look forward to hearing the outcomes from this workshop so we can continue to shape federal policies that protect children. We will work together to develop tools to empower parents and youth, and we will lean on tech executives in the private sector to do their part. She went on to thank FTC Chairman Andrew Ferguson for his leadership on this issue. The full text of First Lady Melania Trumps message is included below.
Im also incredibly grateful to the First Lady for her leadership on the TAKE IT DOWN Act. Getting legislation done in any circumstance is very difficult, and the TAKE IT DOWN Act could not have gotten through Congress without the First Ladys intervention and leadership, said Andrew Ferguson, Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission. The First Ladys advocacy in particular was extremely valuable to get this bill across the finish line, he continued.
Mrs. Trumps message for the FTC workshop reflects her ongoing commitment to promoting public and private sector collaboration for the well-being of children and youth. Todays event follows President Trumps signing of the TAKE IT DOWN Act, a new law that empowers individuals and families to request the swift removal of non-consensual explicit imageryincluding content generated by artificial intelligence. Mrs. Trump championed the passage of the TAKE IT DOWN Act through Congress, as part of her BE BEST initiative, which has long focused on childrens well-being and online protection.Click here to read more about the FTC event.
Full Text of First Lady Melania Trumps Message:
I send my greetings to those gathered at the Federal Trade Commissions Attention Economy Workshop.
At the White House, we recently celebrated the signing of the TAKE IT DOWN Act as part of my BE BEST initiative, which is focused on promoting childrens well-being and safetyespecially in the digital space. This new law reflects those values and marks real progress. But our work is not complete.
I look forward to hearing the outcomes from this workshop so we can continue to shape federal policies that protect children. We will work together to develop tools to empower parents and youth, and we will lean on tech executives in the private sector to do their part.
Like many of you, Ive met with survivors and families whose lives have been affected by non-consensual intimate imagery and deepfake abuse. Let their courage continue to inspire us to find solutions to protect children and youth from online harm. My thanks to Chairman Ferguson for his leadership, and I thank all of you for your hard work to secure a safer future for our children.
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including section 303 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended (the Act) (title 50, U.S.C., 4533), I hereby determine, pursuant to section 303(a)(7)(B) of the Act, that action is necessary to increase production capacity of munitions, missiles and associated equipment, and minerals and that shortfalls in these areas would severely impair national defense capability. Therefore, I waive the requirements of section 303(a)(2) through (a)(6) of the Act for supply chains associated with munitions, missiles and associated equipment, and critical minerals, as defined by title 30, U.S.C., 1606(a)(3), as well as uranium, copper, potash, and gold.
Ensuring a robust, resilient, and sustainable domestic industrial base is essential to our national security and the preservation of domestic critical infrastructure. You are authorized and directed to publish this memorandum in the Federal Register.
By the authority vested in me as President by the laws of the United States of America, and in accordance with section 251A of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act (the Act), as amended, 2 U.S.C. 901a, I hereby order that, on October 1, 2025, direct spending budgetary resources for fiscal year 2026 in each non-exempt budget account be reduced by the amount calculated by the Office of Management and Budget in its report to the Congress of May 30, 2025.
All sequestrations shall be made in strict accordance with the requirements of section 251A of the Act and the specifications of the Office of Management and Budget's report of May 30, 2025, prepared pursuant to section 251A(9) of the Act.
. . . a budget procedure used by lawmakers to cancel or limit funding in order to meet budget goals. It can be intended as an enforcement mechanism to discourage lawmakers from violating a specific budgetary goal or to encourage lawmakers to enact legislation that achieves a desired budgetary outcome. A potential sequestration was most recently included in the Fiscal Responsibility Act (FRA) and could be triggered depending on when Congress completes the appropriation process for [the] fiscal year. . . .Sequestration is a blunt tool used to hold lawmakers accountable to reach their budgetary goals and reduce deficits. However, when used as a long-term budgeting mechanism instead of the failsafe that it is designed to be, there are significant limitations to sequestrations effectiveness with unpredictable or undesired impacts on government spending and the economy at-large. For lasting fiscal sustainability, lawmakers will need to target drivers of the debt to address the long-term, structural imbalance between spending and revenues.
On May 23, 2024, President Trump signed theUnified Command Plan Changewhich was published June 4, 2025 directing the Secretary of Defense:
Pursuant to my authority as Commander in Chief, I hereby approve and direct implementation of the revised 2022 Unified Command Plan requested by the Secretary of Defense on April 22, 2025.
Consistent with section 161(b)(2) of title 10, U.S. Code, and section 301 of title 3, U.S. Code, you are directed to notify Congress on my behalf.
You are authorized and directed to publish this memorandum in the Federal Register.
an Executive branch document prepared by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and reviewed and updated at a minimum every two years. It is classified as For Official Use Only. The UCP assigns missions; planning, training, and operational responsibilities; and geographic areas of responsibilities (AOR) to Combatant Commands. The UCP states that communications between the President or Secretary of Defense and the Combatant Commanders shall be transmitted through the CJCS, unless otherwise directed. When significant operations overlap AORs, the UCP directs the Secretary of Defense to form a task force, determine its commander and assign it to the appropriate Combatant Commander.
By every honest metric, President Donald J. Trumps One Big Beautiful Bill dramatically improves the fiscal trajectory of the United States and unleashes an era of unprecedented economic growth.
HOAX: The One Big Beautiful Bill increases spending.
FACT: The One Big Beautiful Bill delivers nearly $1.7 trillion in mandatory savings a fact that even the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) admits is true.
FACT: This is the highest level of mandatory savings in history dwarfing spending reductions from similar reconciliation bills in 2005 ($140 billion), 1997 ($800 billion), 1993 ($370 billion), and 1990 ($440 billion) on an inflation-adjusted basis.
FACT: The One Big Beautiful Bills $1.7 trillion savings are permanent changes to the law meaning these savings will continue long into the future.
FACT: This is a reconciliation bill not an appropriations (budget) bill. This means there is no mechanism for including spending reductions on 99% of government operations, which will come in future legislation.
HOAX: The One Big Beautiful Bill adds to the deficit.
FACT: So-called forecasts (including by the CBO) predicting higher deficits are based on a false assumption that President Trumps 2017 tax cuts will expire. In reality, extending the CURRENT tax rates which this legislation does has zero impact on the deficit.
If you cite the CBOs faulty score, you must also cite CBOs forecast that President Trumps tariffs will cut the deficit by $2.8 trillion over the next decade. In other words, even the partisan CBO admits the deficit will be slashed by at least $500 billion over the next ten years.
FACT: Of course, the $1.7 trillion savings is partly offset by one-time spending on border security and additional tax cuts (NO TAX ON TIPS, NO TAX ON OVERTIME) which brings the net deficit reduction to exactly $1.407 trillion.
FACT: Upon enactment the bill and through increased tariffs revenues, discretionary spending cuts, and reversing Biden-era regulations the Trump Administration will have taken actions that reduce deficits by at least $6.6 trillion over the next decade.
Remember that over 90% of fake news is negative towards the Trump/Vance Administration MAGA policies. I think the White House is attempting to counteract this negativity by publishing its own articles about what is happening in our government.
ANP EMERGENCY Fundraiser:
Dangerous, Derogatory, Harmful, Unreliable!
Those are some of the exact words used by Googles censors, aka 'Orwelliancontent police,' in describing many of our controversial stories.Stories later proven to be truthful and light years ahead of the mainstream media. But because we reported those 'inconvenient truths' they're trying to bankrupt ANP.
